Background Information

Depersonalization Depersonalization is a dissociative experience characterized by feelings of detachment from one’s self, body, or mental processes. Individuals experiencing depersonalization may feel like an outside observer of their thoughts, feelings, or body, or they may feel as if they’re in a dream. It can occur as a temporary response to stress, as a symptom of psychiatric disorders, or as a feature of certain meditation experiences.

More on Wikipedia

View in glossary is a psychological phenomenon in which a person feels a sense of disconnection from their own body, thoughts, or emotions—like watching themselves from the outside. Traditionally viewed as pathological, it is often associated with anxiety, panic, or dissociative disorders. But what if this experience, in certain contexts, isn’t a symptom, but a signpost?

Richard Castillo’s 1990 paper asks a provocative question: when depersonalization occurs during or after meditation, is it a disorder—or a doorway?

What They Did

Castillo reviewed clinical literature and conducted interviews with six long-term Transcendental Meditation (TM) practitioners. He examined how depersonalization and derealization (the sense that the external world is unreal or dreamlike) manifested in these individuals, whether they caused distress, and how the meditators made sense of their experiences.

Importantly, he drew from cross-cultural psychology and symbolic healing theories, proposing that the interpretation of depersonalization may determine whether it’s experienced as terrifying dissociation—or as spiritual insight.

One Big Result

Every meditator interviewed had experienced depersonalization, often not just during formal meditation but in daily life. But unlike clinical depersonalization, these states were not generally accompanied by anxiety, dysfunction, or emotional distress. In fact, most meditators described a subtle, ongoing experience of detachment paired with calm, contentment, and clarity.

The key difference? Meaning. Meditators framed these experiences as “witnessing” or the emergence of a higher, observing self—a central concept in yogic psychology. In contrast, clinical patients often interpret depersonalization as a sign of “going crazy.”

“The intriguing aspect of this is that apparently by using virtually the same mental maneuvers a syndrome may be produced that… may be experienced either as something to be sought and valued or as something to be feared and called a disease.”

In short: meaning makes the difference.

Miscellaneous Interesting Takeaways

Depersonalization Isn’t Rare

Castillo notes that brief episodes of depersonalization are surprisingly common—up to 70% of young adults report them. Yet when framed in clinical settings, they’re usually pathologized.

A Permanent State?

Several of the meditators described being in a continuous or near-continuous state of mild depersonalization—functioning well, feeling emotionally even, and describing the world as subtly more “alive,” “fluid,” or “vibrating.”

Symbolic Healing in Action

The most striking insight comes from anthropological theory: if a person interprets depersonalization using a spiritual or mythic framework (e.g., “I’m experiencing my higher self”), the experience becomes benign—or even desirable. But if the same event is interpreted medically (“I’m dissociating”), it can trigger panic. Castillo calls this “symbolic healing”, a transformation of meaning that rewrites emotional and bodily response.

Derealization as Sacred

Visual distortions described by meditators—pulsating colors, shimmering edges, and “breathing” trees—closely matched laboratory findings from sensory deprivation studies. These aren’t signs of psychosis, the study suggests, but expected features of perceptual de-automatization that can happen during sustained meditation.

“Instead of ‘pathologizing’ the experiences… they are ‘sacralizing’ the experiences… interpreting them according to a sacred model of reality.”

Citation

Castillo, R. J. (1990). Depersonalization and Meditation. Psychiatry, 53(2), 158–168. 10.1080/00332747.1990.11024497